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“In addition to better roads and the possibility of selling goods in Tiflis, [the report] 
stated that duties on the Russian route were fixed and known, whereas on the Turkish 
side `he is never sure of what the amount of Duties will be -- as every Pasha's 
charges are almost entirely regulated by the state of Politics, at the Moment.'”  
 
Charles Issawi (1970), ``The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830-1900: Rise and Decline of 
a Route,'' International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1, p. 23. 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
Investment decisions occupy a central role among the determinants of growth. As empirical studies 
such as Levine and Renelt (1992) have revealed, fixed investment as a share of gross domestic product is 
the most robust explanatory variable of a country's growth. DeLong and Summers (1991) also provide 
evidence emphasizing the correlation of investment in equipment and machinery with growth. New 
growth theories have been developed that assign a growth-sustaining role to investment. Barro (1990) 
considers a simple endogenous growth model with infrastructure investment. Rebelo (1991) shows that 
differences in growth rates across countries may be explained by differences in government policy in an 
endogenous growth model. In Rebelo’s model, changes in certain policy variables such as an increase in 
the income tax rate decrease the rate of return to investment activities in the private sector and lead to a 
permanent decline in the rate of capital accumulation and in the rate of growth.Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 
study the implications of models that link fiscal policy to growth, and find a positive impact of 
infrastructure investment on growth. Investment is also the most variable component of GDP, and 
therefore an understanding of its determinants may shed light on the source of cyclical fluctuations. 
Policymakers are typically concerned about the ultimate impact of alternative policy measures on 
investment. In this chapter, we will examine the record of investment and growth for the Turkish economy 
over the period 1950-2007 in the light of both the neoclassical growth framework and also new growth 
theories that assign a growth-sustaining role to investment. 
 
Until recently, Turkey's growth performance has been examined in terms of alternative economic 
policy regimes such as state-led growth, import-substituting industrialization, and economic liberalization 
including trade and financial liberalization.
1 More recently, attention has turned towards understanding the 
fundamental determinants underlying this performance.
2 This analysis has revealed that total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth has been typically low in Turkey, and that Turkey's growth has been driven 
primarily by capital accumulation. Yet a detailed study understanding the factors determining investment 
performance in Turkey is not readily available. This is an important deficiency because most if not all of 
                                                 
1 As an example, Krueger (1974, 1995) describes the impact of the foreign trade regime on productivity and growth 
in Turkey. For a discussion of the process of financial liberalization in Turkey, see Atiyas and Ersel (1992) or Rodrik 
(1990). 
2 See Altug and Filiztekin 2006, Altug Filiztekin and Pamuk 2008 and Saygılı, Cihan, and Yurtoğlu (2001).   2
the policy proposals regarding the future of the Turkish economy – be they proposals regarding macro-
economic stability or those aimed at ensuring greater competitiveness – have to do with improving the 
investment environment in Turkey. 
 
Various factors affect investment including macroeconomic instability, corruption, the existence of 
the informal economy, regulatory and tax policy, to name just a few. In an early paper, Mauro (1995) 
examines the relationship between corruption and growth for a cross-section of countries (including 
Turkey). He takes into account the endogeneity of various corruption indicators, and finds that corruption 
and lack of bureaucratic efficiency lower investment, thereby also lowering growth. Farrell (2003) argues 
that the existence of a large informal sector tends to create an uneven playing field for firms, thereby 
deterring investment. 
 
Tax policy can also affect the level and composition of investment expenditures. New studies for the 
U.S. show that tax changes have a much stronger impact on real GDP than previously found, and they 
trace the source of this effect to the strong (negative) impact of the tax change on investment. (Romer and 
Romer 2007). The investment tax credit (ITC) has been a popular fiscal tool to influence the level of 
investment for reasons of macro-stabilization or to stimulate specific sectors. In Turkey, incentives of 
various forms have been implemented to spur exports, to promote a more equal distribution of investment, 
and to aid regional development. As we describe below, the record of such incentive schemes is decidedly 
mixed. Furthermore, high tax and regulatory burdens on the formal economy co-exist side-by-side with a 
large informal economy, creating a negative incentive structure and impeding efforts at creating a more 
efficient tax and regulatory system. 
 
In this chapter, we will study the record of Turkey's past investment performance over the period 
1950-2007. We will also study the sectoral decomposition of investment. We will examine in depth the 
factors that are thought to be important for determining investment behavior in Turkey. Given the central 
role that investment plays in growth, the results of our study will have implications for Turkey's future 
economic performance for its ability to converge to per capita income levels of developed countries, and 
for the viability of its current bid for European Union membership. 
 
2.  Some Observations 
 
In this section, we provide some observations on the behavior of productivity, output growth, and 
investment for Turkey. Following the conventions in Altug, Filiztekin, and Pamuk (2008), we initially 
consider two broadly defined periods, 1950-1980, the so-called “Golden Age” and 1980-2005, the era of 
globalization. This periodization also allows for changes in the policy regime that occurred in 1980 as 
Turkey moved from a regime of import-substituting industrialization to export-led growth accompanied 
by trade and financial liberalization. 
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on real output, number of workers, the capital stock, and 
land.
3 This table shows that output grew at annual rate of nearly 5 percent during 1950-1980, and 4 
percent during 1980-2005.The equivalent growth rate of per capita GDP is around 3 percent during 1950-
1980 and  somewhat over 2 percent during 1980-2005.
4 These per capita rates are above averages for the 
developing countries as a whole. For example, Turkey's average performance is better than that of the 
Latin American countries.
5 
                                                 
3 Real output and capital stock in 1990 prices: State Institute of Statistics (SIS) and Saygılı , Cihan and Yurtoğlu 
(2005). Employment: Bulutay (1995) and SIS. Land: SIS. For a further description of the variables, see Altug, 
Filiztekin, and Pamuk (2008). 
4 See Altug, Filiztekin and Pamuk (2008), Table 2. 




          Average Annual Growth Rates (in percent) 
Aggregate 
Economy 
    
 Output  Labor  Capital   
1950-1980 5.13  1.96  6.36   
1980-2005 4.07  1.35  4.21   
Non-agricultural 
Sector 
    
 Output  Labor  Capital   
1950-1980 6.39  5.65  6.67   
1980-2005 4.74  2.98  4.35   
Agricultural Sector         
 Output  Labor  Capital  Land 
1950-1980 2.95  0.43  3.84  1.95 
1980-2005 1.13  -0.96  1.83  -0.34 
In 1990 prices. Source: Altug, Filiztekin, and Pamuk (2008). 
 
Table 1: Annual Growth Rates of Main Sectors and Factors of Production 
 
 
Second, we observe that the rate of growth of output is considerably higher during 1950-1980. 
This finding holds regardless of whether we consider the agricultural or non-agricultural sector. Rates of 
capital accumulation are also highest during 1950-1980. For the overall economy, the capital 
accumulation rate is 6.36 percent, with the non-agricultural sector displaying a comparable capital 
accumulation rate of 6.67 percent for this period.  
 
Third, we observe that resources are transferred out of agricultural into non-agricultural sectors 
such as manufacturing and services after 1980 as the process of structural transformation in Turkey 
continues. This process is evident from Table 1 which shows the negative growth rates of labor in the 
agricultural sector for 1980-2005. A similar decline is observed for land under cultivation, as arable lands 
are taken up for tourism and residential uses.  
 
The post-1980 period witnessed a change in the orientation of the Turkish economy from import-
substituting industrialization (ISI) to export-led growth. The ISI regime was characterized by State 
Economic Enterprises (SEE's) investing in large-scale intermediate goods production while the 
large private sector firms concentrated their activities in consumer goods industries. The Turkish 
economy under an ISI regime began to experience various internal and external imbalances in the 
period following the oil shocks of the mid-1970’s. A severe economic and political crisis ensued 
in 1979 which led to a sweeping set of measures to liberalize the Turkish economy. The period 
following the 1980 military takeover was witness to a major set of reforms and to the resumption 
of favorable rates of growth amid widespread suppression of trade union activity and of real 
wages. In the early 1980’s,  the Özal government also embarked on an ambitious program of 
infrastructure investment, financed by domestic and external borrowing. As Krueger (1995) 
demonstrates, the share of government expenditures in current GDP increased from a low of 18   4
percent in 1982 to 24 percent by 1990.
6 The ensuing monetization of debt accompanied by 
volatile “hot money” flows under an overvalued exchange rate and rising current account deficits 
led to the the crisis of 1994 and the macroeconomic instability of the 1990’s (see Özatay, 1996, 
2000).  
 
One of the key findings from Table 1 is the apparent decline in the rate of capital accumulation 
after 1980. This can be partly attributed to the experience of macroeconomic instability of the 1990's in 
Turkey. Özatay (1996, 2000) argues that the fundamental factors leading to the 1994 crisis were 
compounded by policy mistakes. The crisis of 2000-2001, which arose from financial and banking sector 
fragility, erupted in the midst of an IMF-sponsored and exchange-rate based stabilization program (Özatay 
and Sak 2002.). Both of these crises are among the major causes for the reduction in the rate of output 
growth and capital accumulation  for the Turkish economy in the post-1980’s period 
 
Turning to a more detailed examination of investment expenditures for Turkey we note that it has 
been highly volatile. In Table 2, we present the growth rates of private investment in selected sectors, 
including manufacturing, tourism, and residential construction for the period 1950-2003.
7 In periods that 
have witnessed growth slowdowns or contractions in the Turkish economy, there have also been declines 
in the rates of growth  of investment across the different sectors. In the periods 1975-1979 and 1980-1984 
leading up to and immediately following the 1980 military takeover, we observe a slowdown and 
subsequent sharp decline in the rate of growth of investment in the manufacturing sector. The growth rate 
of residential investment also falls and becomes negative during the period 1980-1984. The impact of the 
crises that Turkey experienced since the mid-1990's is further manifested in the behavior of investment in 
manufacturing industries and residential construction. Table 2 shows that the rate of growth of investment 
in manufacturing industries is essentially zero during the period 1995-2003 while that for residential 
construction remains negative over the same period.  
 
 
          Average Annual Growth Rates (in percent) 
Period Manufacturing  Tourism  Residential 
1950-1954 21.0  -  19.1 
1955-1959 5.6  -  -5.5 
1960-1964 14.7  -  1.9 
1965-1969 15.4  22.3  16.3 
1970-1974 9.3  2.7  3.7 
1975-1979 2.0  3.7  11.4 
1980-1984 -6.5  12.3  -8.2 
1985-1989 -3.1  43.0  22.9 
1990-1994 12.9  -6.1  7.4 
1995-1999 0.9  15.8  -8.5 
2000-2003 0.0  7.3  -21.2 
Mean 6.56  9.18  3.57 
Standard Deviation  8.73  13.90  13.55 
In 1990 prices. Source: Saygılı, Cihan, and Yurtoğlu  (2005) 
 
Table 2: Investment Growth Rates in Selected Industries 
                                                 
6 The increasing government deficits were due to the costs of these expenditures together with the cost of their 
financing. Transfers were made during this period prior to elections as the ruling party began to lose popularity at the 
polls. 
7 We examine the behavior of investment in the post-2002 period in more detail in the next subsection.   5
 
 
A second observation regarding the behavior of investment expenditures for Turkey is the change 
in the composition of investment in the post-1980's period. Various authors have argued that investment 
expenditures shifted to residential uses after 1980 (Voyvoda and Yeldan 2001; Saygılı, Cihan, and 
Yurtoğlu 2005). Voyvoda and Yeldan (2001) note that the orientation of the economy to export-led 
growth was achieved at the expense of cost savings on wage labor which were then directed to 
export markets by means of a generous export subsidy program. They argue that the subsequent 
shortfall in investment rates in manufacturing circumscribed to a large extent the policy of export-led 
growth deriving from this sector.From Table 2, we observe that investment in manufacturing fell by 3.1 
percent but investment for tourism and residential uses increased by 43 and 23 percent, respectively, 
during the period 1984-1989. The reason for this phenomenon can be traced to the system of incentives 
implemented during this period. Saygılı , Cihan, and Yurtoğlu (2005) have argued that this practice has 
led to excessive resources being devoted to non-productive uses, with subsequent deleterious effects on 
long-term growth. These authors have also argued that efforts to overcome the negative effects of the 1994 
crisis through a system of investment incentives has led to overcapacity in certain sectors such as textiles, 
which have subsequently had difficulty competing internationally. By contrast, the high positive growth in 
investment expenditures in the manufacturing sector during the period 1990-1994 can be attributed to the 
anticipatory response to the Customs Union Agreement with the European Union that was concluded in 
1996. Capital deepening also occurs during the early 1990's as capital is substituted for labor in response 
to higher real wages. 
 
A third observation concerns the changing composition of private versus public investment during 
the post-1980’s period. Ismihan, Metin-Özcan, and Tansel (2002) study Turkey’s investment performance 
and its relation to growth and macroeconomic instability over the period 1963-1999. They distinguish 
between the behavior of private and public investment and demonstrate that there are significant 
differences in investment rates during the pre- and post-1980's.
8 Notwithstanding the change in the 
orientation of the Turkish economy that took place after 1980, they argue that one of the important effects 
of macroeconomic instability in the Turkish economy has been to reduce public investment, especially its 
infrastructure component, and to reverse the complementariness between private and public investment in 
the long run. Examining the dynamic response of the variables, they find that both private investment and 
output respond positively to increases in public investment but that the response of private investment is 
significant and large.   
 
The international evidence indicates that developing countries such as Turkey often display 
capital-intensive growth. Collins and Bosworth (1996) argue that it was the ability of East Asian countries 
to achieve high rates of saving and investment that led to high growth in output. Kumar and Russell 
(2002) and Maudos, Pastor, and Serrano (2000) construct world production frontiers using output and 
inputs of labor and capital under the assumption of constant returns to scale. Their results indicate that 
technical change is non-neutral, leading to productivity growth at higher capital-labor ratios, and that 
capital deepening is the primary cause of convergence in the distribution of labor productivity for the 
period 1960-1990. 
 
The puzzle for Turkey is the low rate of capital accumulation itself – not why growth is primarily 
due to capital accumulation. The growth in the capital-output ratios for a variety of East Asian countries 
ranged around 3-3.5 percent during the period 1966-1990. By contrast, Turkey's capital-output ratio grew 
                                                 
8 They show that public fixed core and non-core infra-structural investment grew at average annual rates of 10.8% 
and 9%, respectively, during the period 1963-1979. However, these rates fell to 2.7% and 0.8% during 1980-1999, 
and the growth of real public fixed investment declined from 9.7% to 1.6%. Over the same periods, the growth in 
real private fixed investment declined from 7% to 6.1%.   6
at a rate of 1.2 percent during 1960-2005. For the period 1960-1980, this growth rate is 3.14 percent, 
which is comparable to some of the East Asian countries. However, the growth rate is only 0.4 percent 
over the period 1980-2005.
9 The observations regarding the changing composition of investment, be it 
towards non-productive uses by the private sector or the shift from public to private investment, appears as 
an added factor that contributes to the mixed investment performance of the Turkish economy over the 
past fifty years. 
 
2.1 Regional issues 
 
Some recent papers have examined the pattern of regional development and the convergence of 
per-capita income across regions or provinces in Turkey. Regional convergence is typically analyzed from 
the viewpoint of the neoclassical growth model. Regions that have lower per capita income ought to grow 
faster, yielding the standard predictions exploited by growth regressions in the macroeconomics literature. 
Filiztekin (1998) uses per-capita provincial value-added data to test for convergence across Turkish 
provinces. He finds evidence only for conditional convergence, that is, convergence conditional on an 
initial set of characteristics such as differences in population growth rates, differences in government 
policy, societal preferences, and technology. Similar findings have been obtained by Doğruel ve Doğruel 
(2003), ve Karaca (2004). 
 
Temel, Tansel, and Albersen (1999) find evidence for a bipolar distribution characterizing the 
long-run behavior of labor productivity across regions. Their results indicate that the majority of the 
provinces move to a low productivity level while a few move towards a high productivity level.
10Kırdar 
and Saraçoğlu (2007) examine the record of convergence across Turkish provinces after accounting for 
the role of internal migration. They find a negative relationship between provincial output growth rates 
and migration. They also show that migration tends to expedite convergence of income growth across 
provinces. The reason is that those choosing to migrate are precisely those who have low levels of human 
capital and market skills. Despite providing important insights into the record of regional growth and 
convergence, none of these studies have considered the relationship between investment behavior and 
regional growth. 
 
Altug and Küçük (2006) employ the device of investment maps to examine the temporal evolution 
of per-capita investment and value-added across regions in Turkey for the period 1980-2000. They 
consider the behavior of both public and private investment and value-added in manufacturing industries. 
They find that private investments in manufacturing increase along an axis that stretches from 
southeastern Turkey to northwestern Turkey over the period in question. This makes the Marmara region 
the hub of industrial activity in Turkey. Nevertheless, there is evidence of increasing economic activity in 
such provinces as Gaziantep, Kayseri,  Adana that reflects the establishment of free-trade zones and other 
investment incentive schemes in the post-1980's. A similar southeast-northwest axis also characterizes the 
behavior of public investment. However, public investment in manufacturing tends to display a less 
uneven distribution across provinces. Examining value-added maps for public and private industries, the 
authors find that the public sector investments have gone some way in ameliorating the pattern of regional 
income inequality. However, it is difficult to conclude the same for private sector investments. 
 
In a related study, Öğüt and Barbaros (2003) present indices of human development (HDI) and 
human poverty (HPI) for Turkish provinces. Their findings illustrate the well-known disparity in  income 
and human welfare levels between eastern versus western parts of Turkey, and mirror the results of Altug 
and Küçük (2006) in an alternative fashion. Öğüt and Barbaros (2003) also examine the system of 
investment incentives in Turkey. Surprisingly they find that Marmara region was the primary recipient of 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Altug and Filiztekin (2006) or Altug, Filiztekin, and Pamuk (2008). 
10 This is consistent with the notion of convergence clubs emphasized by Quah (1994).   7
the majority of tax incentives estimated as a function of total investment expenditures or per capita 
employment. They also argue that regional incentive schemes have been put in place without a clear-cut 
set of regional priorities. More importantly, they argue that the system has often degenerated into 
“investing for tax breaks” as opposed to “tax breaks for investing,” with only 15 percent of tax incentives 
going to the less developed regions that actually need them.  
 
2.2 Has the pattern changed since 2002? 
 
One of the widely contested issues regarding the Turkish economic performance is that the period 
since 2002 constitutes a “break” with the past. The period since 2002 corresponds to the single-party rule 
of the Justice and Welfare Party (AKP), during which adherence to fiscal discipline and a variety of 
macroeconomic reforms including banking sector reforms that had been put into effect after the crisis of 
2000-2001 have led to a regime of macroeconomic stability and to low and declining inflation and interest 
rates. Figure 1 shows the behavior of total investment as well as its breakdown between private and public 
investment over the period 1987-2007, measured in 1987 prices. We observe the large decline in 
investment during the crisis of 2000-2001 and the subsequent rebound. Indeed both private and public 
investment exhibit the J-curve phenomenon, rising steeply after the large decline during the crisis of 2000-
2001. Figure 2 provides a further breakdown of private investment into machinery and equipment (M&E) 
investment and construction. Investment in M&E in particular shows robust growth from 2002 onwards. 
Saygılı, Cihan, and Yurtoğlu (2005) have argued that one important factor in the recent investment 
performance is the increase in newer vintage capital in the total capital stock. This has occurred as firms 
have taken advantage of favorable developments in global credit markets and an overvalued exchange rate 
to upgrade the quality of their capital stocks. Figure 2 shows that private sector construction also displays 
a modified J-shape. However, the lags in investment due to the “time-to-build” feature imply that 
investment in construction bottoms out later than M& E investment.
11 However, consistent with the 
growth rates in Table 2, we observe that investment in the residential sector or private construction 




                                                 
11 For a discussion of time-to-build and investment, see Altug (1993).   8




Figure 2: Private Investment Expenditures. In billions of New TL. 
 
Figure 1 shows that the largest decline in public investment occurred during the 1994 financial 
crisis. Furthermore, consistent with the findings of Ismihan, Metin-Özcan, and Tansel (2002) for the 
period up to 1999, public and private investment expenditures show no long-run relationship in the post-
2002 period . This is especially true after the crisis of 2000-2001, implying that any complementariness 
that existed between them is further weakened during this period. Finally we observe that all components 
of investment start to decline after 2006, as uncertainty about future political developments once again 
becomes an important consideration in economic agents' decisions.. 
 
In summary, we observe a significant improvement in investment performance during the first 
term of the Justice and Welfare Party (AKP) rule which started late in 2002. However, part of this 
improvement can be attributed to a J-curve type effect as well as favorable global liquidity conditions. 
Nevertheless, we observe that investment performance starts to deteriorate after 2006 in Turkey. Viewing 
investment performance in Turkey on the broader time line, the developments since 2002 do not provide 
sufficient evidence of a break with its past investment performance. 
 
3.  Determinants of Investment in Turkey 
 
The factors underlying Turkey's investment performance are many and varied. Yet, as the quote from 
the economic historian Charles Issawi illustrates, problems that were important in determining trade and 
economic activity in Turkey more than a hundred years ago still continue to have relevance today. In this 
section we examine in more detail some of the factors behind Turkey's investment and growth 
performance.  These include taxation and regulatory policy, the existence of a large informal sector, and 
corruption.  
   9
  3. 1Taxation and other regulations 
 
The overall tax burden in Turkey, standing at 24.5 percent of GDP in 2006, is relatively low compared 
with an average of 34.5 percent for the OECD countries and 39.8 percent for the EU19 countries (see 
Table 3 below). However, Table 3 also reveals that the tax burden in Turkey has increased in an 
unprecedented manner by about 10 percentage points since 1990, after having fluctuated around 10 
percent during the period 1965-1990. 
 
 
  1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 
Turkey  10.6 9.3  11.9 13.3 11.5 14.9 16.8 24.2 24.3 24.5 
OECD  25.6 27.5 29.4 31.0 32.7 33.8 34.8 36.1 35.8 35.9 
EU19  27.7 29.7 32.2 34.9 37.6 38.2 39.0 40.6 39.7 39.8 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 1965-2007 
    
Table 3: Total Tax Revenues as Percentage of GDP, 1965-2006 
 
 
The role of tax policy in stimulating investment has been the topic of much analysis. Much of the earlier 
literature was conducted for the case of tax changes under certainty.
12 Altug, Demers, and Demers (2008) 
have shown that in an environment under uncertainty temporary tax incentives (or lower policy 
persistence) generally increase the variability of investment both in the short and the long run. Temporary 
incentives such as a temporary investment tax credit (ITC) lower investment in the short run and raise it in 
the long run. Policy-makers may thus face a long-run trade-off between the level and the volatility of 
investment.  Tax policy often suffers from problems of commitment and time-inconsistency as well. 
 
In a recent review of the Turkish tax system in terms of its impact on investments and growth, 
Zenginobuz (2005) notes that the tax system in Turkey has now become the primary source of public 
governance risk for both domestic and foreign companies considering investments in Turkey. The Turkish 
tax system suffers from a number of major problems including the lack of transparency and predictability. 
In its current form, it is a patchwork of fragmented legislation and regulations that were enacted over time 
to solve one pressing issue or the other without a coherent strategy. Its sheer complexity, together with the 
frequency with which it has been subjected to piecemeal changes in rules and regulations, creates major 
uncertainties for the business community and investors. During 2000-2005 there were 46 amendments to 
major tax laws (an average of 9.2 amendments per year) and tax rates were adjusted 157 times by the 
Council of Ministers (an average of 31.4 per year and 2.6 adjustments per month). Moreover, the Ministry 
of Finance has issued 253 tax communiqués over the same period to explain and clarify the 
implementation of amended tax laws and rates.
13 In addition, as noted by Zenginobuz (2005), there are 
taxes that create considerable red tape for businesses without raising significant revenue (the foremost 
example being the stamp duty on all contractual agreements transacted, which raises only about 2 per cent 
of overall tax revenue). 
 
Uncertainty thus created renders investment planning extremely difficult. Zenginobuz (2005) 
reports the results of a survey of major foreign companies operating in Turkey, where tax and regulatory 
policy uncertainty is among the top three issues that are considered to pose major/severe problem for the 
operation and growth of their businesses. The Global Competition Survey of the World Economic Forum, 
a widely used indicator of business environment in a country by foreign firms doing business there as well 
as domestic firms, also has listed tax regulations among the most problematic factors for doing business in 
                                                 
12 For a review and discussion, see Demers, Demers, and Altug (2003). 
13 See TÜRMOB (2005).   10
Turkey consistently over the years. In the Global Competition Survey 2008-2009 (World Economic 
Forum, 2008), “tax regulations” is listed as the second most problematic factor for doing business in 
Turkey (the first being “inefficient government bureaucracy”), and Turkey is ranked 123
rd   among 134 
countries covered in terms of extent and effect of taxation. 
 
       
 
 Personal  Corporate  Social  Property  Goods 
  Income Income Security    &  Services 
Turkey  15.6  6.0 22.4  3.6 48.7 
OECD  24.8 10.7 25.3 5.7  31.5 
EU19  22.6  8.8 30.2  4.8 31.3 
 Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-2007 
 
Table 4: Tax Revenue of Main Headings as Percentage of Total Taxes, 2006 
 
 
As for the structure of the Turkish tax system, Table 4 above reveals that it heavily relies on 
revenue collected through taxes on consumption. The taxes on goods and services stood at 48.7 percent of 
total tax revenue in 2006. This is about 17 percentage points higher than the corresponding figure for 
OECD and EU19 countries. With such heavy reliance on indirect taxes, the current tax system is very far 
from being an optimal tax structure where the tax burden is distributed more evenly between different tax 
instruments for the sake of economic efficiency as well as fairness.
14 Moreover, given the size of the 
informal sector in Turkey (see below), the relatively low overall tax revenue burden is misleading about 
the very high tax burden faced by the formal sector. Specifically, the high social security contribution 
rates, together with other tax distortions in product markets, act as a major impediment to employment 
growth and further formalization of the economy. Until very recently, the tax wedge (the difference 
between the gross wage – what employers have to pay in wages and social security contributions – and the 
net amount employees receive after tax and social security deductions) has been one of the highest among 
the OECD countries and stands at 42.76 percent for a single earner in a family composed of a  married 
couple with two children (calculated at the average wage level of a production worker).
15 
 
Table 4 also reveals that the share of personal income taxes in total tax revenues is strikingly low 
in Turkey, standing at about 15 percent in 2006 compared to a EU19 average of over 22.6 percent and an 
OECD average of 24.8 percent for the same year. This is despite a relatively high average personal income 
tax rate (of about 30 percent) compared to OECD countries and is likely to be a reflection of the large size 
of the informal sector in the Turkish economy. The share of corporate income tax in total tax revenues is 
also low compared to those for OECD countries and EU19 countries. 
 
As a partial response to the apparent inefficiencies and anti-growth aspects of the tax system 
summarized above, several measures were taken during 2006-2008 with a view to reducing the tax burden 
on formal businesses and their customers. The corporate income tax rate was reduced from 30 to 20 
percent, bringing the rate to the low side when compared to the rates currently prevailing in OECD 
countries. The value-added tax rates on textile and clothing and on hotels and restaurants were reduced 
from 18 to 8 percent in both cases. In addition, a personal income tax allowance was reintroduced into the 
personal income tax structure, which led to as much as 5 percentage points reduction in the tax wedge of 
                                                 
14 For an assessment of the distributional impacts of the very high taxes on consumption in Turkey, see Gökşen, 
Özertan, Sağlam and Zenginobuz(2008). 
15 See Figure A6, page 58, of Zenginobuz (2005), which displays this particular tax wedge for Turkey and selected 
OECD countries over the period 2000-2003.   11
low income wage earners. Finally, as of October 2008 the social security contributions of employers were 
reduced by 5 percentage points, bringing the tax wedge to the 36-39 percent range for most workers.
16  
The government has also announced its intention to further reduce the social contribution rates, but further 
cuts are unlikely before a major reform of the social security system which currently imposes a heavy 
burden on public spending. 
 
As noted above, among investors and the business community “inefficient government 
bureaucracy” is listed as the most problematic factor in doing business in Turkey. This is in part due to 
lack of coherence in the formal rules and regulations related to doing business, which altogether works as 
an impediment for increasing productivity and growth in employment, but relates more generally to 
overall institutional quality. The Global Competitiveness Survey cited above classifies Turkey as 
competitively disadvantageous in all subcategories of its institutional quality indicator.
17 All of this 
renders access to capital, labor, and technology in the formal sector costly, leading the less productive 
firms to escape to the informal sector. An “informality trap”
18 ensues, as it becomes extremely difficult for 
less productive informal or semi-formal enterprises operating in grey zones without the requisite 
transparency to access financial resources that could allow them to modernize and increase their 
productivity. 
 
There exists a set of incentives to promote business activity and investments. Among them are:
19 
 
•  tax benefits exempting machinery and equipment related to business investments from custom 
duties and value added tax; 
•  subsidies on interest rates provided on the basis of location, scale, and scope of investment 
projects;  
•  regional incentives in the form of personal income tax relief and social security contribution 
subsidies for investments in provinces with a GDP per capita level equal to or less than USD 
1,500 as of the end-2001;  
•  incentives granted to Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in the form of subsidized credits, 
incubator facilities etc.;  
•  incentives to support Research and Development (R&D) in the form of refunds for qualifying 
R&D expenses, corporate tax breaks, reductions in social security contribution rates for R&D 
personnel etc;  
•  direct subsidies and tax breaks for Technology Development Zones that have been created around 
major universities; and 
•  incentives to promote exports in the form of subsidies in order to cover expenditures related to 
international brand development, international market research etc. 
 
In theory, incentives, such as investment incentives, may be used to rectify various market distortions 
– including those caused by taxes. However, they also get in the way of markets performing their essential 
function of providing correct signals to investors and consumers. Moreover, incentives cost in terms of tax 
revenue and their impact, if any, is limited to the short run. When coupled with inefficient government 
                                                 
16 See Table 4.2, page 149, in OECD (2008). 
17 Some of the subindicators include property rights; intellectual property protection; diversion of public funds; 
public trust of politicians; judicial independence; favoritism in decisions of government officials; wastefulness of 
government spending; burden of government regulation; efficiency of legal framework; and transparency of 
government policymaking. See, Country Profile: Turkey, Global Competitiveness Survey, World Economic Forum, 
2008. Available at http://www.weforum.org/documents/GCR0809/index.html. 
18 See, for example, Maşatlıoğlu and Rigolini (2008). 
19 For an up to date account of investment incentives in Turkey, see the document at the tax portal of 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers Turkey, available at http://www.pwc.com/tr/eng/ins-sol/publ/investmentincentives.pdf.    12
bureaucracy, investment incentives may serve as fertile ground for bureaucratic hurdles that delay 
investments and effectively block foreign firms from entering the domestic market. Öğüt and Barbaros 
(2003) note that a given tax or incentive scheme has required coordination among thirteen different 
regulatory bodies for its implementation. They also criticize the system of tax rebates put into use during 
the period 1983-1989 as failing to promote innovation and high-technology-investments. Instead, tax 
rebates for export-promoting industries have led to corrupt practices such as “fictitious exports”. In the 
long run, investments, in particular foreign direct investment (FDI), respond only to improved business 
environments where good governance structures are in place. 
 
3.2 The informal economy 
 
Schneider and Enste (2000) define the informal economy as involving unreported income from the 
production and exchange of goods and services that would be taxable were it reported to the tax 
authorities. Informal economic activity is widespread and it is a nontrivial part of the overall economy 
across countries. According to the recent estimates by Schneider (2007), the size of the informal economy 
in 2004/2005 was 7.9 percent of the official GDP in the United States, 15.3 percent in Germany, 23.2 
percent in Italy, 14.8 percent on average in 21 rich OECD countries, 29.8 percent on average in 28 Asian 
countries, 38.8 percent on average in 25 East and Central European and Former Soviet Union countries, 
and 42.2 percent on average in 21 South American countries. Schneider (2007) estimates the size of the 
informal sector in the Turkish economy for 2004/2005 as 33.2 percent of the official GDP. His estimates 
for the informal sector in the Turkish economy remain almost constant around this value since 1999/2000, 
pointing at a structural persistence.
20  
 
The estimates by Schneider (2007) are in line with those in a report by Tax Inspectors Board of 
the Turkish Finance Ministry (Tax Inspectors Board, 2005). Based on an estimate of tax loss due to 
informality, the report provides an estimate of 30.04 percent of the official GDP as the size of the informal 
sector in 2004. The estimates for informal sector in the Turkish economy by Çetintaş and Vergil (2003) 
for the longer period of 1971-2000 vary between 16-31 percent of the official economy and are broadly 
consistent with the estimates cited just above. 
 
In early studies of the issue the main determinants of the size of the informal economy were 
identified as tax and social security burdens (Frey and Pommerehne 1984; Tanzi 1999; Schneider 
1994,1997). Taxes affect labor-leisure choices in the formal economy and also increase labor supply in the 
informal economy, leading to possibly extensive distortions. The greater the difference between the total 
cost of labor in the official economy and after-tax earnings from work, the greater is the incentive to work 
in the informal economy. 
 
More recently, attention has been focused on the impact of political and social institutions that 
govern the economy, where bureaucracy, corruption, and a weak legal system are viewed as the main 
culprits. Djankov, La Porta, Lopoez de Silanes, and Schleifer (2002) emphasize that start up costs generate 
large informal sectors. Friedman, Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-Lobation. (2000) suggest that it is not the 
tax rate per se that push businesses into informality, but bureaucracy and weak legal system.
21More 
recently, Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) identify start-up costs due to government regulations and 
corruption as the main determinants of the informal economy using a dynamic general equilibrium model. 
They also find that enforcement and regulation costs are equally important determinants of the size of the 
informal economy. 
 
                                                 
20 See Table 3.2.2, page 17, of Schneider (2007). 
21 They use 1990s data for 69 countries, covering all continents and income ranges. Turkey is not included in their 
data set.   13
Finally, there is also a mutual relationship between the quality of public services and the size of 
informal economy. An increase in the size of the informal economy can lead to reduced tax revenues, 
which in turn reduces the quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and services. This can lead to an 
increase in tax rates for firms and individuals in the official sector, a deterioration in the quality of public 
goods (such as infrastructure) and of administration, leading to even stronger incentives to move to or 
remain in the informal sector. Johnson, Kaufman, and Zoido-Lobaton. (1998, 1999) present a simple 
model of this relationship. Their findings show that smaller informal sectors appear in countries that 
collect higher tax revenues with reasonable tax rates, fewer laws and regulations, and less bribery facing 
enterprises. Countries with better rule of law, which is itself related to the ability to collect tax revenues, 
also have smaller informal sectors. Wealthier countries of the OECD, as well as some Eastern European 
countries find themselves in the good equilibrium of relatively low tax and regulatory burden, sizeable 
revenue mobilization, good rule of law and corruption control and relatively small informal sector. By 
contrast, a number of countries in Latin America and the former Soviet Union exhibit characteristics 
consistent with a bad equilibrium: tax and regulatory discretion and burden on the firms are high, the rule 
of law is weak, and there is a high incidence of bribery and a relatively high share of activities in the 
informal economy. 
 
Regarding the effects of informal sector on growth, Easterly (1993) and Loayza (1996) show that 
growth is negatively related to informal production. Using data for 110 countries (including Turkey), 
Schneider (2005) provides estimates of the impact of informal sector on the growth of the official 
economy. If the informal sector of the economy (in percent of official GDP) increases by one percentage 
point, the growth rate of the official GDP in developing countries declines between 4.5 percent and 5.7 
percent. In contrast, for industrialized countries one percentage point increase in the size of the informal 
sector leads to 7.7 percent increase in the growth rate of the official economy. Former result reveals that 
the impact of the informal sector on the growth of the official economy is a complex phenomenon that 
depends on the income level of the country. For Turkey, the results obtained by Çetinbaş and Vergil 
(2004) using time series data are in line with the results of Schneider (2005) for the developing 
economies, namely that the extent of the informal sector has a negative impact on the growth of the 
official economy. The causality tests they provide suggest that the size of the informal economy is an 
important predictor of the growth in the official economy but not the opposite. Typically, the negative 
effects of the existence of a large informal sector on growth derives from the fact that it creates an uneven 





As briefly alluded to above in the discussion on informal sector, the existence of corruption and 
bribery and the extent of the informal sector are related with each other. Johnson, Kaufman, and Zoido-
Lobaton (1998) find a statistically significant relationship between the various measures of bribery and 
corruption and the informal economy. Friedman, Johnson, Kaufman, and Zoido-Lobaton (2000) also find 
that corruption is associated with more informal economic activity across 69 countries. They argue that 
entrepreneurs move to the informal sector not to avoid taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and 
corruption. To the extent that the informal sector leads to less investment and growth in an economy, the 
existence of corruption will exacerbate these negative impacts in proportion to the extent that it increases 
the size of the informal sector. 
 
Corruption also has a direct impact on the investment behavior of firms. It deters investment by 
raising operational costs and thereby creating additional uncertainty in net revenues. In addition, if capital 
investments are partially irreversible, then greater uncertainty about future returns on investment increases 
the option of waiting to undertake an irreversible investment (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). However, the 
existence of corruption may also allow certain firms to bribe corrupt officials to win lucrative government   14
contracts, to obtain credit at below market interest rates, and to collude with tax collectors to reduce tax 
payments. Thus, everything else being equal, firms that benefit from corruption may invest more than they 
would have done otherwise (Hellman, Jones and Kaufman 2002). Hence, in theory the impact of 
corruption on firm-level investment is ambiguous. 
 
However, almost all of the empirical findings of macro- and micro-level studies point at a 
negative relation between corruption and investment. Studies that employ country-level data on 
investment and country-level data on corruption find that corruption deters aggregate investments (Mauro 
1995; Wei 2000; Rock and Bonnet 2004; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004).Using firm-level data on 
investment and country-level data on corruption, Smarzynska and Wei (2000) focus on foreign owned 
firms in transition countries and find that corruption has an adverse effect on investment. Batra, Kaufman 
and Stone (2003) pool firm level data on both investment and corruption for 3,100 firms in 81 developing 




Corruption is perceived to be a major problem in Turkey by private enterprise and the public at 
large, particularly in government procurement. Based on a country wide survey of the public at large 
(administered in 2000) and private enterprises (administered in 2001), Adaman, Çarkoğlu, and Şenatalar 
(2003) report very high level of perceived corruption in the provision of public services at the customs 
offices, by the traffic police, at the property title deed offices, at the municipalities, by the police, and at 
tax offices.
23 For private enterprises the tax offices are perceived to be the most corrupt, followed by the 
customs offices. In addition to perceptions of corruption, Adaman, Çarkoğlu, and Şenatalar (2003) also 
enquired about the actual experience of bribery by private enterprises and the public at large. Of the 1,200 
private enterprises surveyed, 46 percent reported having paid a bribe within the two years before the 
survey, while out of 3,000 people surveyed 18 percent answered the same question affirmatively. 
 
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International, an index widely used both 
by international investors and academic researchers for international comparisons, also corroborates the 
perception of high level of corruption in Turkey. The CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of 
corruption as seen by business people and country analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 
(highly corrupt). Turkey's CPI score was 3.1 in 2003, placing Turkey at 77
th in the transparency ranking of 
133 countries. It has exhibited a modest but consistent improvement every year since 2003 and was 
reported as 4.6 in 2008, moving Turkey to 58
th in the transparency ranking of 180 countries.
24 
A similar improvement in the perception of corruption by the public at large has also been observed by 
Adaman, Çarkoğlu, and Şentalar (2009) in the recent update of their 2000 survey.
25 Together with 
macroeconomic stability, greater transparency and an improvement in the perception of corruption may be 
reasons behind the greater observed flows of foreign direct investment to Turkey since 2003.    
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have considered the record of investment and growth for the Turkish economy. Our 
analysis indicates that Turkey's investment record is characterized by three main facts. First, capital 
                                                 
22 Gaviria (2002), using firm level data for both investment and corruption for 2,612 firms in 29 countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, is the only study that finds no significant relationship between corruption and firm level 
investment growth. 
23 The institutions are listed in decreasing order of perceived corruption. See Adaman, Çarkoğlu, and 
Şenatalar(2003), page 51, for details. 
24 CPI scores of Transparency International are available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy\_research/surveys\_indices/cpi. 
25 Their 2001 survey of private enterprises has not been updated yet.   15
accumulation is the main factor behind Turkey's growth performance; yet investment has been peripatetic 
in Turkey. Second, changes in the composition of investment expenditures away from manufacturing and 
towards residential uses and other non-productive sectors in the post-1980's period have meant a 
misallocation of resources that have also contributed negatively to overall growth. Third, the loss of 
complementariness between public and private investment in the post-1980's as a result of the decline in 
public investment has also weakened the impact of private investment expenditures. As the discussion in 
Section 3 revealed, underlying these facts is the existence of an inefficient tax and regulatory system and a 
large informal economy, both of which go hand-in-hand with corrupt practices in different aspects of 
economic life. 
 
Turkey's ability to attain high and sustainable growth rates of output depend on its ability to promote 
productivity-enhancing investment, whether of the domestic sort or through foreign direct investment. A 
system of tax incentives that help to reduce the size of the informal sector, recognize regional priorities, 
and enhance Turkey's technological capabilities appears as an important goal of macroeconomic policy in 
the near and medium term. Some progress has been made in this regard by the recent changes in the 
corporate income tax as well as by modest reforms that have brought down the tax wedge, but a 
comprehensive tax reform is needed to further encourage investment, risk-taking and entrepreneurship. 
Rather than making gradual small improvements to the existing structure, substantial simplification of the 
overall structure and major across-the-board reductions in tax rates appear to be essential also for 
attracting foreign direct investment. 
 
The discussion in Section 3 also revealed the adverse effects of uncertainty introduced by 
constantly changing tax laws as well as other regulations on business practices. Tax reform should be 
implemented along with strategies that implies a credible commitment to not changing the new tax regime 
over an extended period of time. A simple tax regime with low rates, if accompanied by reduced tax 
expenditures and fewer tax breaks, will not only facilitate tax enforcement and compliance but also 
broaden the tax base and reduce the risk of extreme revenue loss. At the same time, a campaign to reduce 
the size of the informal sector will have to be initiated. Among other things, this means commitment to a 
zero amnesty policy and strict enforcement of it. Ongoing improvements in tax administration, especially 
in its use of electronic information processing systems, are essential for reducing tax evasion and fighting 
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